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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellee seeks to sustain judgment of the trial 
court. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
After a trial on the merits the Court denied Appellant's 
claim and entered decree reforming instrument so that it complied 
with agreement made at the time of the sale. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellee seeks to have the decision of the Lower Court 
sustained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In September of 1968, Appellees, as Sellers, and 
Appellant, as Purchaser, entered into an agreement for the sale 
of the surface rights of 54 acres of Appellees1 land located in 
Duchesne County, Utah, together with 31 shares of water and a 
mobile home for a total purchase price of $7000.00. An Earnest 
Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase was executed on or about 
September 12, 1968. On November 10, 1968, Appellees and Appellant 
executed an Uniform Real Estate Contract for the purchase of the 
property agreed upon. On October 30, 196 9, Appellees executed a 
Warranty Deed in favor of Appellant including a right of way to 
and from the land and 31 shares of Dry Gulch Irrigation Company. 
2 
The Earnest Money Receipt, the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract, and the Warranty Deed were prepared by Appellant or 
at Appellant's instructions. 
At the time of the execution of those documents, the 
Appellees were the owners of only one-fourth of the mineral 
rights. Appellant was aware of this at the time she prepared the 
documents of sale. No mention of the mineral rights is made in 
any of the documents of sale nor in the deed. 
Appellee, Mr. Forrer, testified that just prior to 
signing of the Earnest Money Receipt and again prior to the 
execution of the Uniform Real Estate Contract, he walked over the 
land with the Appellant and told her that no minerals went with 
the land and that Appellant replied that she was not interested 
in the minerals but only wanted a place for her cattle. 
Appellant testified that there was no discussion of the 
minerals except that Appellee, Mr. Forrer, gave her a copy of an 
escrow agreement executed in 1951 indicating that Appellee, Mr. 
Forrer, together with his brother then owned a one-fourth interest 
Appellee testified that he did not have such a meeting with the 
Appellant and that he had not had a copy of the escrow agreement 
since he signed it over to his brother 13 years ago. 
The testimonv of the Aooellee. Mr- Forrer, was 
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corroborated by the stipulated testimony of Appellee, Mrs. 
Forrer. Appellant's testimony is uncorroborated. 
In July of 1970, the Appellees were contacted by Mr. 
Howell Spear to whom they sold their interest in the minerals 
for $500.00. Appellant made no effort to lease or sell the 
minerals, nor to collect the lease payments or to have the deed 
reformed until just shortly before this suit was brought in 1975. 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED PAROL EVIDENCE 
TO REFORM THE DEED. 
The deed and instruments of sale were silent concerning 
the mineral rights, yet the Appellees owned only a one-fourth 
interest therein which they claimed to have reserved and which 
Appellant claims should pass by operation of law. Parol evidence 
has been readily allowed by this Court to determine the actual 
intent of the parties where the parties omitted the mineral rights 
from the deed. In Bench v Pace, 538 P 2d 180 (1975), this Court 
sustained Judge Sorensen's admission of parol evidence to establish 
the clear agreement of the parties with regard to the mineral rights. 
In that opinion the Supreme Court of Utah cited Sine v Harper, 118 
Utah 415, 222 P 2d 571 and E. A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. 
v Broderick, Utah, 522 P 2d 144 (1974) in support of this rule. 
4 
The general proposition is stated by Professor Corbin at Contracts 
Section 536. 
"Before the legal operation of any agreement can 
be determined, however definitely it may be embodied 
in a written "integration11, it must be interpreted 
by the Court. For this process of interpretation, 
the "parol evidence rule" does not exclude evidence 
of prior communications and understandings (although 
there may be some other limitations on the extent to 
which such evidence may be used). Until a contract 
has been interpreted, the Court cannot know whether 
there is an inconsistency between it and other 
agreements, oral or written, prior or subsequent. 
Before interpretation, a Court cannot know what it 
is that cannot be "varied or contradicted". In 
addition, the rule does not purport to exclude any 
testimony to prove fraud, illegality, accident, or 
mistake, it does not prevent rescission or a decree 
for reformation and enforcement." 
In E.A. Strout Western Realty supra this Court stated: 
"Parol evidence may be received to clarify ambiguous 
language in a contract, to show what the agreement 
was relative to filling in blanks, and to supply 
omitted terms which were agreed upon but inadvertantly 
left out of the written agreement." 
The Trial Court in this case correctly allowed parol 
evidence to interpret the written instruments because they were 
ambiguous and failed to express the parties understanding. It 
would be repugnant to law and equity to allow the Appellant to 
employ the parol evidence rule to hide the true and concurring 
intent of the parties. 
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II 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE FOR THE TRIAL COURT 
TO REFORM THE DEED TO CONFORM WITH THE ORAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
THE PARTIES, 
This case is comparable to the recent case of Bench 
v Pace, supra. In that case, as in this case, the conduct of 
the plaintiff showed that they made no claim to the minerals 
until shortly before the suit was initiated some five years 
following execution of the agreement. Accordingly the controlling 
written instrument was interpreted to include such a reservation 
even though the instrument contained no provision relating to the 
oil and mineral estate. 
The legal standard of Bench v Pace is stated at 123 
. . . in view of all the circumstances it appears 
the omission was an oversight on the part of the 
scrivener and the parties to the contract, and 
the conduct of the plaintiffs clearly shows they 
made no claim to the mineral estate until shortly 
before this suit was initiated. 
Thus, the Court looks to all the circumstances including 
the conduct of the parties. Furthermore, in evaluating the findings 
of the Trial Court the evidence to sustain the judgment need not 
be uncontradicted. Weight should be given to the opportunity 
of the Trial Court to observe the demeanor of the witnesses. As 
was stated by this Court in Naisbitt v Hodges 6 Utah 2d 116, 307 
P 2d 620 (1957) 
All that is required is that evidence exists 
whereby this court can say that the trial judge 
acted as a reasonable man in finding that the 
proof of the fact asserted is greater than a 
mere preponderance. 
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It is not required that the testimony be uncontradicted 
to be clear and convincing. In Neal v Green, 71 Wash. 2d 40, 426 
P 2d 485 (1967) the Court relied on the Trial Court!s evaluation 
of the creditability of the witnesses and the conduct of the 
parties to uphold the reformation of the deed. The Court said: 
"There was conflict in the testimony. But this 
does not mean that the Court must deny reformation. 
'Certainty of error1 is not the same as 
'uncontradicted testimony of error.f " 
See also, Wright v Brem, 467 P 2d 736, 81 N.M. 410 (1970), 
and Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 3 (1950), Section 615 and cases cited. 
In Nelson v Dougherty, Okla. 357 P 2d 425 (1960) the 
Court said: 
"Evidence to sustain a judgment preforming a written 
contract must be clear, unequivocal, and decisive, 
but this does not mean that it must be uncontradicted; 
and the judgment of the Trial Court in such action, 
where the evidence is conflicting, should be given 
weight, and should be affirmed on appeal, unless the 
Appellate Court is satisfied that the standard of 
proof required has not been met and the conclusion 
reached is wrong. 
* * * * 
"In Crabb v Chisum, 183 Okl. 138, 80 P 2d 653, we 
considered a case where the factual situation was 
very similar to that involved in the instant case. 
The mistake in the notes in that case was due to an 
error on the part of the scrivener, which was not 
noticed by the plaintiff until long subsequent to 
the date of the execution of the notes. In that 
case we affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court 
granting reformation, although the evidence was 
conflicting, pointing out that the Trial Court, 
which had the witnesses before it and had an 
opportunity to observe their demeanor and to 
determine their credibility, had decided this 
issue in favor of the plaintiffs.11 
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The evidence in the instant case adequately supports 
the findings of the Trial Court. The Appellee testified that he 
twice told the Appellant that he was not conveying the minerals 
and that the Appellant stated that she was only interested in 
land for her cattle (T.T. pp. 62,63, and 66). The Appellee only 
owned an one-fourth mineral interest as Appellant knew, yet 
Appellant, an experienced and liscensed real estate saleswoman, 
prepared the agreements and did not include any reference to the 
mineral estate although the deed specifically listed the right of 
way and water rights (T.T. p. 27 and Exhibit C). The testimony of 
Mr. Forrer is corroborated by the stipulated testimony of Mrs. 
Forrer (T.T. p. 77). Appellant did not attempt to sell or lease 
the minerals between 1968, the date of the sale, and the bringing 
of this suit in 1975 despite increased speculation in oil and gas 
in the area (T.T. p. 74). Nor did Appellant attempt to collect 
the rental even though she knew the minerals were under lease 
(T.T. p. 12) . 
In addition to the foregoing facts, the relative 
experience of the parties is significant. Appellees are elderly 
and without experience in selling real estate and stated that they 
believed that for the minerals to be included they should be listed, 
as were the water and rights of way. Appellant, an experienced 
real estate saleswoman, came to the Appellees for a listing, but 
bought the property herself, subtracting a $600.00 commission out 
8 
of the $1000.00 down payment. Appellant now seeks to rely on 
a legal presumption and the parol evidence rule which she wasnft 
aware of at the time, to claim damages of $1000.00 per acre. 
These circumstances and the corroborated testimony of the 
Appellee thus adequately supports the findings of the Trial Court. 
Ill 
THE MUTUAL MISTAKE IS NOT OF THE TYPE WHICH PRECLUDES 
REFORMATION OF THE DEED. 
Based on his conversations with the Appellant upon whom he 
relied to prepare the documents of sale and in light of other 
items listed on the deed as included, Appellees understood the 
deed to reserve them the minerals. This is not unusual for a 
layman to rely on his listing real estate agent in this fashion* 
It is more unusual that the Appellant failed to expressly list the 
one-fourth mineral interest. In fact, it is this mutual mistake 
which gave rise to the admission of parol evidence and reformation. 
For negligence to prohibit reformation, it must be the sole cause 
of the oversight and a violation of a positive legal duty that 
prejudices the other party. 
As was stated by this court in McMahon v Tanner, 122 Utah 333 
249 P 2d 502 (19 ): 
"The type of negligence which will preclude a 
party from securing equitable relief of the nature 
here demanded is thus stated in Pomeroy's Equity 
Jurisprudence, 4th Ed., Sec. 856: 
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'As a second requisite, it has sometimes 
been said in very general terms that a 
mistake resulting from the complaining 
partyfs own negligence will never be 
relieved. This proposition is not 
sustained by the authorities. It would 
be more accurate to say that where the 
mistake is wholly caused by the want of 
that care and diligence in the transaction 
which should be used by every person of 
reasonable prudence, and the absence of 
which would be a violation of the legal 
duty, a court of equity will not interpose 
its relief; but even with this more guarded 
mode of statement, each instance of negligence 
must depend to a great extent upon its own 
circumstances. It is not every negligence 
that will stay the hand of the court. The 
conclusion from the best authorities seems 
to be, that the neglect must amount to the 
violation of a positive legal duty. The 
highest possible care is not demanded. 
Even clearly established negligence may not 
of itself be a sufficient ground for refusing 
relief, if it appears: that the other party 
has not been prejudiced thereby.' " 
This is the general rule applied in the majority of cases. 
See Carpenter v Hill 131 Colo. 553, 283 P 2d 963 ( ); 
Seydin v Frade, 88 Nev. 174, 494 P 2d 128 (1972); and Thorsteinson-
v Waters, 65 Wash. Ed 739, 399 P 2d 510 (1965). 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court in the instant case correctly admitted the 
parol evidence and reformed the deed to conform to the initial 
agreement between the parties. There was no negligence in this 
case of the type that would preclude reformation of the deed. 
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The deed did not express the understanding of the parties and 
was clearly ambiguous. The clear and convincing evidence before 
the Trial Court was that no mineral estate was intended to pass 
to the Appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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